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Although there have been many splendid books on early Amer-
ican naval history, there is a need for a new survey of the sub-
ject, particularly one with a broad perspective. This book tries 
to meet that need. It begins before 1775 because at least un-
til the time of the Civil War American naval history was in-
fluenced greatly by attitudes, practices, and conditions dating 
from American colonial history. It pays attention to other na-
vies, particularly those of Britain and France, because Ameri-
can naval history is closely connected with British and French 
naval history. Although it can stand alone, it is intended as a 
companion volume to my book The Age of the Ship of the Line: 
The British and French Navies, 1650–1865 (Lincoln: Universi-
ty of Nebraska Press, 2009). Both books are concerned with 
the ways navies reflect diplomatic, political, economic, and 
social developments.
Looking at American naval history from a wide perspec-
tive helps us to avoid reading the United States Navy’s twenti-
eth-century triumphs back into previous centuries. Until the 
Civil War, America was a minor naval power. During its first 
two major wars, the War of American Independence and the 
Preface
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War of 1812, the American navy was virtually annihilated. It 
is true that the navy fought a number of successful combats 
against individual enemy ships and even won battles on Lake 
Erie and Lake Champlain during the War of 1812. On balance, 
however, the record of the American navy during the age of 
sail was not very impressive, particularly in comparison with 
the British navy, which twice virtually swept it from the sea. 
Given America’s enormous resources and growing popula-
tion, its navy generally was undersized and poorly funded. Its 
participation in the Civil War of 1861–65 was very different. 
The navy suddenly expanded hugely and performed wonders 
against an extremely dangerous enemy. Although the navy 
then languished for a couple of decades, the foundations of 
American naval power had been established. Once America 
decided it wanted a modern navy, it was able to build one in 
fairly short order. In the twentieth century it became first a 
major naval power and then the world’s dominant naval power.
Why did it take almost a century for the United States to 
build its first large navy? As I will argue, it was largely due to 
the continuation of traditions established in America’s colonial 
past, such as localism and sectionalism, an obsession with the 
frontier and territorial expansion, and an aversion to strong 
central government and taxation. By weakening the power of 
the states, expanding American industry, and strengthening 
the federal government, the Lincoln administration finally 
made possible America’s rise as a naval power.
In writing this book I have benefited from the work of nu-
merous fine historians, including my friends John Hatten-
dorf, Bill Fowler, Thomas Schaeper, Denver Brunsman, and 
Jim Bradford; its mistakes are my own. I also wish all too be-
latedly to acknowledge the encouragement given to me by a 
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model naval officer, Lieutenant Commander Jay Arnold, ex-
ecutive officer of the uss Duncan (ddr 874), aboard which I 
served in 1964–66. As with previous books I wish to thank 
my wonderful family, particularly my wife, Susan Kruger, and 
children, Veronica Lamka, Robert Dull, Max Kruger-Dull, and 
Anna Kruger-Dull. I dedicate this book to two history buffs, 
my nephews Peter and John Hamburger.
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iThe naval great powers during the age of sailing ship warfare 
that ended in the middle of the nineteenth century were, with 
the exception of Great Britain, not those of the great age of 
battleship and aircraft carrier warfare during the first half of 
the twentieth century. The other great sailing navies, those of 
France, Spain, and the Netherlands, played a relatively minor 
role during the twentieth century. Instead the British navy was 
joined by three newly arrived naval great powers: Japan, Ger-
many, and the United States. All three launched major build-
ing programs during the final decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury and quickly became prominent once the United States 
defeated Spain in 1898 and Japan defeated Russia in 1904–
1905. The groundwork for this ascendancy was laid earlier, 
however. In the middle of the nineteenth century the govern-
ments of Germany, Japan, and the United States greatly in-
creased their power. Henceforth they were able to use their 
economic growth to become naval great powers. The equiva-
lent of the German unification of 1871 and Japan’s Meiji Res-
toration of 1867–68 was the American Civil War.
one
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Although the two decades after the end of the Civil War 
were a period of naval retrenchment, the Civil War had laid 
the foundation for the United States to overcome the attitudes, 
practices, and conditions that had hindered the growth of its 
navy. These hindrances were part of the legacy of America’s 
colonial past.
Between the founding of Jamestown in 1607 and the be-
ginning of the American Revolution in 1775, Britain’s Amer-
ican colonies developed important shipping and fishing in-
dustries but undertook little independent naval activity. This 
period of subservience to the mother country and to the needs 
of the British navy was very influential, however, in the sub-
sequent development of the American navy. The Revolution 
did not eliminate America’s colonial legacy. For the United 
States to become a naval power, it had to overcome a number 
of the things it inherited from its colonial past: a weak indus-
trial base compared with naval great powers like Britain and 
France, a distrust of government and hence a reliance on pri-
vate enterprise, sectionalism and a preference for state gov-
ernment rather than national government, an inability or re-
luctance to raise by taxation the money necessary for military 
and naval activity, and an obsession with internal expansion 
that necessitated a substantial investment on the frontier rath-
er than on the sea. All of these obstacles were present almost 
from the beginning of English settlement in North America.
ii
The English colonization of North America began in 1607 
(after earlier failures); the first permanent French colony was 
established a year later. Both Virginia and New France began 
as private business investments approved by the respective 
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crowns. This was a change from the sixteenth-century Span-
ish model in which the rulers of Castile and Aragon played (at 
least in theory) a direct role in exploration and colonization. 
Soon, however, the French colony was taken over by the royal 
government and administered from Europe. In contrast the 
more than a dozen English colonies established between 1607 
and 1732 differed not only from the colonies of other nations 
but even from one another.1 Some colonies like Connecticut 
had their own charters and administered their own affairs un-
der very loose government supervision. Others like Pennsylva-
nia were run by proprietors, who had veto power over the de-
cisions reached by their colonial assemblies. Still others like 
Virginia became royal colonies with a governor appointed by 
the crown. Even royal governors, however, had to share pow-
er with their locally elected assemblies, which, like the Eng-
lish House of Commons (or, after the 1707 union with Scot-
land, the British House of Commons), used their control over 
the budget to gain a share of political power.2 
Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, the struggle for power between assemblies and their 
governors or proprietors left many Americans distrustful of 
executive authority; even the inhabitants of Connecticut and 
Rhode Island, where governors were popularly elected, dis-
trusted the kings of England, who might take their charters 
from them. Moreover, the British government exercised its 
own veto power over most colonial legislation, using it, for 
example, to control the issuing of currency by individual col-
onies. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, however, 
British control over the North American colonies was admin-
istered loosely, largely because Britain was preoccupied with 
European affairs.3 These colonies also were considered less 
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important than the rich sugar-producing colonies of the Ca-
ribbean, such as Jamaica. Thus most American politics was 
local, and American political life, like American society, was 
dominated by wealthy local elites who resented interference 
from England.
The North American colonies were diverse not only politi-
cally but also socially, economically, culturally, and religiously, 
although over the course of the eighteenth century these dif-
ferences became less marked.4 A planter in the South using 
slaves to raise tobacco or rice for European markets had, for 
example, different views on politics and economics than did 
a small farmer in New England producing for a local market. 
The colonies did trade among themselves (usually by sea be-
cause long distances and primitive roads made it difficult and 
expensive to move products by land), but generally Great Brit-
ain and the Caribbean were their most important markets and 
the chief sources of their imports. Moreover, except for a rela-
tively efficient intercolonial postal system, the American col-
onies lacked common institutions. What they did share was a 
desire for expansion into new lands. All too often this led to 
competition rather than cooperation, such as the attempted 
intrusions by Virginia and Connecticut into parts of Pennsyl-
vania. Even in military matters, cooperation between colonies 
often was halfhearted or ineffectual.
War was a recurrent part of life in British North America. 
Most wars were fought against the Native American nations 
whose hunting grounds or agricultural settlements were cov-
eted by British Americans. In the early days of settlement, the 
colonies were not self-supporting and depended on supplies sent 
from England by sea. Soon, however, they achieved a measure 
of self-sufficiency. They were able to fight Indian wars using 
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troops they raised themselves. Fortunately for them, Indian 
opposition in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
was uncoordinated. Unlike the powerful sixteenth-century 
Aztec Empire of Mexico or the Inca Empire of Peru, the Indi-
ans encountered by the British were divided into many small 
tribes or confederations of tribes. By the late seventeenth cen-
tury few contained more than 10,000 people. The colonists 
were able to exploit rivalries between the various Indian na-
tions as well to make use of their own greater population and 
advanced weaponry.
More challenging, however, were wars conducted against 
neighboring Dutch, Spanish, and French colonies. These some-
times involved the use of ships. Seldom were enemy warships 
encountered, but for logistical reasons colonial wars often in-
volved moving troops by sea, usually on transports provid-
ed by colonies like Massachusetts. Until the so-called French 
and Indian War of 1754–60, most soldiers in British Ameri-
ca served in either the militia or colonial regiments. Their fre-
quent target was the French colony of Acadia, located across 
the Bay of Fundy from Massachusetts. It was captured on sev-
eral occasions by New England raiders, but until the 1713 Trea-
ty of Utrecht it was returned to France each time that hostil-
ities ended.
The French colonies initially were less of an obstacle to the 
English colonies than was the Dutch colony of New Netherland 
along the Hudson River, which separated the New England 
colonies from English colonies to the south. In 1664, during 
the second of three wars fought between the Netherlands and 
Britain in the mid-seventeenth century, a small English squad-
ron captured the city of New Amsterdam and renamed it New 
York. During the next war a Dutch squadron recaptured the 
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city and colony.5 Fortunately for the English, the colony was 
returned to England when the war ended in 1674.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 made William of Orange, 
ruler of the Netherlands, and his wife, Mary, daughter of the 
deposed James II, joint rulers of England. William’s archen-
emy, Louis XIV of France, immediately became the enemy of 
England and soon went to war on behalf of the exiled James. 
The Nine Years’ War (1689–97) was fought chiefly in Europe, 
but the New England colonies also participated. In 1690 they 
even mounted an attack against Quebec, the capital of New 
France, but the attack failed.6 
The War of the Spanish Succession began in 1702. Another 
attack on Quebec was made in 1711, but most of the troops and 
the supporting warships were sent from England. Because of 
the ineptitude of the British commander, several transports 
were wrecked while ascending the St. Lawrence, and the at-
tack was abandoned. An attack on Port Royal, the capital of 
Acadia, was successful, however. At the end of the war, Acadia 
was retained by Britain, although its borders were not defined 
in the 1713 peace treaty.7 This treaty also confirmed both the 
accession of Louis’s grandson to the Spanish throne and the 
retention of Florida by Spain. (During the war, troops from 
South Carolina had made an unsuccessful attack on the Span-
ish fort at St. Augustine while their Indian allies attacked the 
Spanish fort at Pensacola.)8
Soon after the war ended, France and Britain became al-
lies. Tension in North America did not disappear, although it 
was moderated by the powerful Iroquois confederation, which 
acted as a buffer between the British and French colonies.9 
The French, meanwhile, built the large fortified city of Lou-
isbourg on Isle Royale (now Cape Breton Island) as a shelter 
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and support for their fishing fleet used in the Newfoundland 
and St. Lawrence fisheries.10
Thus far the North American colonies had played only a 
minor role in the great wars of Europe. Except for the abor-
tive 1711 attack on Quebec, no large fleets had come to North 
American waters. Nonetheless, Britain’s North American col-
onies did make significant, although mostly indirect, contri-
butions to British naval strength. The ways in which the col-
onies did and did not participate in naval warfare affected the 
American navy once the colonies asserted their independence.
iii
Most contemporaries saw trade between the British colonies 
and Britain itself as the major colonial contribution to British 
naval strength. The mother country’s Navigation Acts chan-
neled much of the colonies’ overseas trade to the British West 
Indies or to Great Britain, as well as restricting that trade to 
ships built and manned in Britain or its colonies. The pur-
pose of the Navigation Acts was threefold. They enriched the 
British treasury, fostered the development of the British econ-
omy, and provided for the training of British sailors. (It was 
too expensive for Britain’s navy to maintain a large peace-
time fleet for training purposes, so most sailors in the navy 
received their training aboard merchant ships or fishing ves-
sels; the same, of course, was true for the French and Span-
ish navies.) By 1775, perhaps a quarter of British shipping ton-
nage was devoted to trade with British North America and the 
British West Indies; moreover, nearly a third of British mer-
chant ships had been built in America, where shipbuilding 
costs were less than in Britain.11
The American colonies made other important contributions 
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to the mother country. They supplied raw materials, such as 
indigo for dying fabric, and were an increasingly important 
market for British manufactures and services such as bank-
ing. American grain, meat, and fish were vital to feeding the 
British West Indies, which devoted almost all their acreage to 
crops for export such as sugar. Masts from New England and 
naval stores such as pitch, tar, and turpentine from the south-
ern colonies were used by the British navy.12 Colonial troops 
not only conducted military operations in North America but 
also assisted British troops in the Caribbean.
Although the British colonies in North America were im-
portant to the British economy in general and the navy in par-
ticular, there were certain areas in which they were not given 
the chance to contribute, were not capable of contributing, or 
did not choose to contribute. This would hinder naval devel-
opment once America became independent.
First, the American colonies were given few opportunities 
to build warships for the British navy because their ships had 
a poor reputation for durability; the colonies, however, were 
allowed to repair British warships and to convert merchant 
ships into warships. Although the British navy contracted to 
build many warships in private dockyards in Great Britain, it 
purchased only a few frigates (medium-sized warships of 22 
to 44 guns) from American shipyards and none of the larger 
ships of the line that were the chief component of naval pow-
er.13 The French built a couple of 60-gun ships of the line at 
Quebec, as well as some smaller ships, but these were poor-
ly constructed. The only shipbuilding facility in the Western 
Hemisphere comparable to the great dockyards of Europe was 
at Havana, where the Spaniards, with access to tropical hard-
woods, built some of the finest warships in the world.14 The 
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specialty of the British colonies was the privateer, a privately 
built, owned, and manned but government-sanctioned armed 
vessel used chiefly to capture enemy merchant ships. These 
were built for speed rather than endurance, and served only 
during wartime. Hundreds of American privateers were used 
during the wars of 1739–48 and 1756–63 against France and 
Spain. Although privateers also were used during the Amer-
ican Revolution, American shipyards then also had to build 
sturdy, heavily armed warships to match those of the British.15
Second, the economy of the British colonies was underde-
veloped by Western European standards, partly because the 
British preferred to see them as providers of raw material and 
customers for British products rather than as rivals. Thus in 
1775 there were only three iron foundries in New England ca-
pable of casting cannon for warships.16 Americans also were 
short of gunpowder, cannon balls, and other necessities of 
naval warfare. The colonies’ greatest shortage, however, was 
specie, the gold or silver necessary to provide financial back-
ing for currency. When the colonies revolted against Britain, 
their first response was simply to print money without back-
ing, the same response the Confederacy would adopt in 1861. 
In both cases the result was inflation and the eventual destruc-
tion of the currency’s purchasing power. The American Rev-
olution was saved from disaster by financial aid from abroad, 
but the American revolutionary navy, virtually unable to pay 
its sailors or replace its ship losses, faded into insignificance.
Third, although many Americas served aboard merchant 
ships or fishing boats, few had served as sailors in the British 
navy, and almost none had served as officers or naval admin-
istrators; only three of the American navy’s original twenty-
six captains had any prior experience in the British navy.17 The 
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British navy periodically attempted to force American mer-
chant sailors to serve (an imposition called impressment), but 
the Americans, claiming to be exempt from such service, re-
fused. They received support from public officials and from 
crowds that often resorted to intimidation or even violence. 
Usually the British gave up the effort.18 Merchant sailors could 
learn fairly quickly how to adjust to life aboard privateers or 
warships, so this was not a long-term obstacle to the develop-
ment of an American navy. It was far more difficult, howev-
er, to turn merchant ship or privateer officers into naval of-
ficers. This problem would also face the French navy during 
the French Revolution, but it at least had a few veteran cap-
tains and other officers who were willing to serve. The first 
American navy had no one who had commanded a squadron 
of ships, let alone a fleet.19 George Washington had the help 
of former British army officers like Charles Lee and Hora-
tio Gates and foreign volunteers like “Baron” von Steuben 
and the marquis de Lafayette; the navy had only Pierre Lan-
dais, an emotionally unstable former French junior officer. 
It would take considerable time to develop officers capable of 
commanding a group of ships in combat.
iv
Except for brief hostilities against Spain (and against pirates) 
in the 1720s, Britain was at peace from 1713 until 1739. North 
America was a backwater for the British navy, which did lit-
tle more than assign station ships, none larger than a frigate, 
to Boston, New York, Charleston, Virginia, and eventually 
Savannah.20 The colonies did not have permanent armies or 
navies, and there was not even a maritime equivalent to the 
rudimentary military training provided by colonial militias.
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This period of peace ended when Britain declared war against 
Spain in 1739. The colonies participated enthusiastically, but 
the initial results were disastrous. Thousands of American pro-
vincial troops joined British troops in an attack on the fortified 
seaport of Cartagena de Indias on the northern coast of South 
America. The attack, supported by a very large British fleet, 
failed, and many of the Americans died of disease. Provincial 
troops from Georgia and South Carolina supported by British 
frigates also were unsuccessful in an attack on St. Augustine.21 
The Spaniards attempted to retaliate with an attack on Georgia 
in preparation for an attack on South Carolina, but the other 
British colonies were not threatened except by Spanish priva-
teers. When France entered the war in 1744, New York and the 
New England colonies were menaced by attack from the Indi-
an allies of New France. Massachusetts governor William Shir-
ley organized an army of New England provincial troops to at-
tack the great fortress of Louisbourg. Although he was able to 
assemble a troop convoy and arrange an escort of Massachu-
setts navy vessels, he needed the assistance of the British navy. 
He appealed for help to Commodore Peter Warren, who com-
manded a small squadron at Antigua in the British West In-
dies. Warren had spent many years in America, had an Amer-
ican wife, and had participated in the St. Augustine attack. He 
brought two small ships of the line and two frigates to Nova 
Scotia, where he rendezvoused with the New Englanders. The 
attack on Louisbourg caught the French by surprise, and the 
city was captured after a seven-week siege. British Americans 
had won their first great battle, albeit with the help of the Brit-
ish navy. To their disappointment Louisbourg was returned to 
France when peace was concluded in 1748, but the border be-
tween the British and French colonies remained tense.22
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Neither the British nor the French government wished for 
another war, but the situation in North America was volatile. 
As in 1713, the peace negotiations had failed to define the lim-
its of Acadia and had left the task of delineating the border 
between New France (including Canada and Acadia) and the 
British colonies to a bilateral border commission. The British 
and French governments failed to come to a general agree-
ment on the issues between them, and the commission’s dis-
cussions proved more divisive than helpful.23 The recent war 
had disrupted French trade with Indian nations south of the 
Great Lakes. British American traders and land companies 
moved to fill the vacuum. A group of Virginia land speculators 
sought to open western Pennsylvania to settlement. This led to 
armed confrontations between Canadian troops and Virginia 
volunteers near what today is Pittsburgh. Subsequent negoti-
ations between the British and French governments failed to 
resolve the dispute. In 1755 both governments sent troops to 
North America, and open hostilities soon began.24
The British colonies were unprepared for war. As recent 
events had demonstrated, they did not even respect one anoth-
er’s borders. Benjamin Franklin proposed that the colonies es-
tablish a joint military command, but his suggestion was reject-
ed by both the British government and colonial assemblies.25
The new war was far wider in scope than previous colonial 
wars. The British and French sent regular infantry battalions 
and large fleets to North America. Their respective colonists 
played a subordinate role in the war, although large numbers 
of Canadian and American volunteers and militiamen served 
beside the regulars; during the decisive campaign of 1759, for 
example, almost 20,000 American troops served with a sim-
ilar number of British soldiers, while some 10,000 Canadian 
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militiamen were among the 15,000 troops opposing them.26 
Recruitment of American provincial troops was greatly aid-
ed by the British government’s willingness to partly subsidize 
them, thereby neutralizing American suspicion, disunity, and 
reluctance to raise taxes. A major factor in the eventual Brit-
ish triumph was the overwhelming numerical superiority of 
the British navy. The colonists did provide troop transports 
for an unsuccessful attack on Louisbourg in 1757, but many 
transports for the successful campaigns of the following two 
years against Louisbourg and Quebec were sent to American 
ports from England. Most American sailors worked aboard 
merchant ships or privateers.
Other British attacks such as those against Fort Niagara 
and Montreal made use of waterways such as Lake Ontario, 
Lake George, Lake Champlain, and the St. Lawrence River.27 
The ships ranged from small boats to warships carrying as 
many as 18 cannon. This was an important precedent; signif-
icant naval actions on inland waters would occur during the 
wars of 1775–83, 1812–15, and 1861–65.
v
The war ended with the French being driven from the North 
American continent. The British victory, however, was even 
more destabilizing than had been the indecisive previous war. 
It was followed almost immediately by a major Indian war in 
1763–64. Worse still, it disrupted relations between the Brit-
ish colonists and the government in Britain. For several de-
cades the government in London had used the colonies as a 
source of patronage, while allowing colonial legislatures a con-
siderable degree of autonomy. It had angered American colo-
nists by, among other things, restricting their manufacturing 
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certain items and restricting their issuing currency. This was 
counterbalanced, however, by the protection afforded them by 
the British navy, as well as by their pride in being British sub-
jects. They protested when they felt rules were being violat-
ed, such as by impressment of sailors in American ports, but 
generally their yoke was light enough to be tolerated. Benja-
min Franklin, for example, sent to England by the Pennsylva-
nia Assembly to seek redress against Pennsylvania proprietor 
Thomas Penn, considered himself simultaneously a Briton, 
an American, and a Pennsylvanian. He even lobbied to make 
Pennsylvania a royal colony.28
The war, however, altered the relationship between Britain and 
its American colonies. With the French threat gone, Americans 
no longer needed Britain for protection from European enemies 
(and came to see the British army as less a protection from In-
dians than as a menace to themselves). The war, moreover, had 
caused the British to adopt new policies such as sending British 
troops to America and had added greatly to the British nation-
al debt. The British government now expected the colonies to 
help bear the heavy cost of policing the frontier. Furthermore, 
British authorities were outraged at the colonists for their mas-
sive illegal trade with the French West Indies during the war 
against France.29 They now took action to curtail smuggling and 
to force compliance with the Navigation Acts, including the de-
ployment of a large number of small warships in American wa-
ters.30 Americans attempted to evade British trade restrictions 
and even retaliated against British warships, including burn-
ing the schooner Gaspee (one of fifteen such ships purchased 
in America by the British navy between 1764 and 1775).31 They 
began to view Parliament as corrupt, more as a tyrannical Eu-
ropean government than as a protector of their interests.
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The decisive event in the breakdown of relations between 
Britain and its colonies was the so-called Boston Tea Party of 
December 1773. This destruction of tea sent to America by the 
British East India Company prompted Parliament to retaliate 
by passing the Coercive Acts, including the closing of Boston 
Harbor and numerous other American ports. Americans be-
gan preparing for armed resistance, smuggling gunpowder 
from Europe and the West Indies, and seizing cannon from 
minor British military posts.32 Open hostilities began in April 
1775 when a British army detachment from Boston attempted 
to seize gunpowder from the neighboring towns of Lexington 
and Concord. Americans now faced not only the British army 
in Boston but the entire British navy. They would also have to 
deal with the legacies of their own past: rivalries among the 
different states and regions of the country, distrust of central 
government, a preference for printing money rather than pay-
ing taxes, a shortage of leaders with experience in European-
style military and naval warfare, a rudimentary bureaucracy, 
and an unevenly developed economy.
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